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Development Discourses on the Tibetan
Plateau: Urbanization and Expropriation of
Farmland in Dartsedo
The term “development” defines the Chinese official discourse on Tibet and Tibetans. Officials speak of development in symbolic and practical terms as it serves the overall policy strategy towards Tibet. This paper
examines the meaning of development in the context of encounters between government officials and local
residents in Dartsedo (Chin.:Kangding) in Eastern Tibet over a new town project. Because urbanization has
been portrayed as the driving force of growth and development in Tibetan areas, this paper investigates the
implementation of such an initiative. I argue that project implementation on the ground stands in sharp
contrast to the language of “people first” and “scientific” development in the official discourse. Furthermore,
I argue that the discrepancies between rhetoric and reality have led to a series of socio-economic problems
for the relocated farmers.

INTRODUCTION
Urban areas in China, including Tibet, have grown
rapidly since the 1980s (Yeh 2008). The government
and, to an extent, the academic community in China,
have largely overlooked the implication of rapid urbanization for the millions of farmers or villagers who
have been “legally or illegally” made landless over the
years. They have been officially categorized as “landlost farmers” (shidinongmin) who lost their land, especially in peri-urban villages, due to urbanization
and real estate development. The population of landlost farmers was 40 to 50 million in 2005, although
this figure does not include farmers who have moved
illegally (Zhao 2005). According to official statistics,
three million people become land-lost farmers every year in China. The total number is expected to
double in 2020 with the current pace of urbanization (Zhao 2005). The official media, both national
and local, frequently carries news of how well “landlost farmers” have been compensated in the form of
education, health and employment benefits (Sichuan
News Online 2009).
The urbanization rate has grown steadily in the
18 counties of Ganzi (Tib.:Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, including Kangding, from 15.8 percent in 2004 to 21 percent in 2010, according to local
government reports (Ganzi Prefecture Government
2004, 2010). In Kangding, the urbanization rate
had already reached 39 percent in 2002 (Kangding
County Government 2005). Indeed, development
and investment have brought economic opportuni-

ties, modern infrastructure, and an increased flow of
goods and capital into the region. However, for some,
the intervention has resulted in the creation of dependence due to the low priority given to local participation and empowerment through such facilities
as education, science, technology, and public health
(see Gele, Zhuoma, and Lumei 2006; Demurger et
al. 2002). At the same time, cities such as Lhasa and
Kangding have increasingly been populated by Chinese migrants from impoverished regions.
URBANIZATION: RE-TERRITORIALIZING
TIBETAN SPACE
Emily Yeh and Mark Henderson (2008) describe
urbanization in Tibet as a “process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of a westward-expanding
Han China.” Urbanization has not only brought about
economic growth, urban infrastructure, and population increase but at the same time a reorganization
of the traditional Tibetan cultural landscape. In other
words, it involves a re-appropriation of both physical
and socio-cultural space in order to serve government
objectives. Nyiri (2006) illustrates how the Chinese
state draws on cultural history to produce “scenic
spots” across the country. In contrast to the construction of sites in mainland China, newly created Tibetan scenic spots appear to lack local cultural history,
but are constructed in tune with the popular imagination of the Tibetan periphery. This raises the question of what rapid “development” and urbanization
could mean for the peripheral Tibetan or non-Tibetan
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residents. In his seminal book on economic growth and discrimination in Tibet, Fischer (2005) argues that the current
top-down and urban-biased state development investment
model has resulted in the further marginalization of Tibetans,
who inhabit mainly rural areas. In contrast, official cadres and
Han migrants living in Tibet’s urban areas are among the first
beneficiaries of development. Drawing on Fischer’s (2005)
ideas, Yeh (2006) argues that while greenhouse projects in
Lhasa have significantly expanded the production of vegetables, these developments have not benefitted local Tibetans
due to a lack of flexibility and sensitivity in the government
policy about the structural and cultural context of development and livelihood. Quantitative surveys carried out by Hu
(2003) also show that migrants in Lhasa (mainly from Sichuan and Gansu) have substantially benefitted from the state
development drive, whereas Tibetans lag behind in terms of
education and employment opportunities.
The official discourse of development in Tibet portrays a
rosy picture. It does so primarily through official figures on
macro-level growth (see State Council 2009). There has been
little dispute regarding the rapid economic growth and urbanization that have taken place during the last two decades in
Tibet. Nevertheless, the distribution of development benefits
have become a key issue in research on contemporary Tibet,
as I have discussed in this paper. This marginalization, I would
argue, is mainly due to the existing power relations between
development actors implementing government interventions.
A caveat is that this does not mean Tibetans have not benefitted at all from the current development drive. The fact that
rural Tibetans get access to comparatively better goods and
infrastructure such as electricity, TV, mobile phones, modern
transportation, and housing are obvious signs of development
as understood in official discourse. Rather, the concern here is
how “development” as a concept, discourse, policy, and value
has been practiced, experienced, and understood by policymakers and locals alike during the implementation of development projects. This paper examines the extent to which
policy-makers achieve their objectives while locals abide by
the official definition of development in order to make the
best of it.
In their field studies of rural households in Shigatse Prefecture, Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui (2010) argue that,
far from being marginalized, Tibetan farmers have benefitted
from the trickle-down effects of the “people-first” development drive. They report that approximately 46.9 percent of
the villagers in their survey received between 10,000 and
20,000 yuan for the construction of new houses, thanks to
the “comfortable housing program.” The government subsidy
constitutes between 15 and 20 percent of the cost of a new
house. Official TAR sources state that, by the end of 2010,
the government would provide 80 percent of the region’s rural households with subsidies of between 10,000 and 25,000
yuan (Xinhua 2009). The housing program has been praised
in the official media as a “project of the people” aimed at improving their livelihood. This program, Goldstein, Childs and
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Wangdui (2010) argue, is a government attempt to buy loyalty from the Tibetans in order to bring stability to the region.
However, the project has been subject to criticism from rights
group such as the Human Rights Watch (2006) over its strict
specifications and the mortgage burden it imposes on rural
Tibetan households.
This article builds on the work of the aforementioned
scholars, and explores how the macro-level, top-down, and
monolithic development discourse has come to terms with
the issues of livelihood and local empowerment in Kangding. Yeh’s (2007) insightful work on the use of “quality” and
“backwardness” in official development discourse shows that
development idioms are not only “merely cultural” constructs
but have also been shaped by specific national and regional
development policies. However, the meaning of “development” as used in official discourse and, to some extent, in
academic literature on China appears to be taken for granted.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
I examine in this article how government officials as well
as local residents in Kangding invoke the concept of “development.” Looking only into the quantitative data of income
and subsidies may not be sufficient to characterize development in the region. A qualitative inquiry into how development as a concept has been interpreted, experienced, and negotiated can complement the analysis of the official statistics
and surveys. Towards this end, the article draws theoretical
and methodological inspiration from post-modern theorists.
In his groundbreaking book on development, Ferguson
(1994:17) argues that development in Lesotho failed because
of the conceptual gap between policy makers and reality on
the ground. In the process, bureaucratic state power expanded. Ferguson treats the failure of development as an “anthropological puzzle” that needs to be solved through contextualization of development discourse, which comprises a complex
web of stated goals, unstated intentions, and unintended outcomes. Similarly, Escobar (1995) defines development as a
social construct embedded within a web of institutions and
power relations, and thus better approached as discourse.
Discourses of development are systematic constructions and
representations of subjects, dominant and dominated actors.
Such a critical outlook on development provides a theoretical
foundation to analyze the discourse of development in Tibet,
but is by no means a rejection of development as such. On the
contrary, development as a set of practices cannot be considered devoid of historically evolved institutions, norms, and
discourses (Rist 1997). Development actors are located within their own respective life-worlds and discursive domains.
Thus, development policy and practice can be approached
by exploring “how discrepancies of social interest, cultural
interpretation, knowledge, and power are mediated at critical
points of confrontation and linkage” (Long 1999: 21). Drawing on this perspective, I will examine how local officials define, practice, and represent development in the process of a
project intervention, and how villagers of Simaqiao experi-

ence, articulate, and respond to this intervention.

2005 within the prefecture was 1,310 yuan (Ganzi Yearbook
2006: 87). After the 1980s, the production of vegetables inA NEW KANGDING AND THE FATE OF SIMAQIAO
creased significantly, thanks to the introduction of “scientific”
cultivation methods. By 1997, the annual production of vegSimaqiao (Tib.:tsamchusampa) was one of seven villages
etables per mu was around 3,000-4,000 kilograms. The total
in the township of Yulin (one of 18 townships in Kangding
agricultural production of Yulin reached 3,000 tons, generatCounty). The village used to be a small and fertile peri-urban
ing a total cash income of between 1.5 and 2 million yuan
village on the outskirts of Kangding. The villagers harvested
(Kangding County History 1997: 14).
vegetables two to three times a year, which they sold in the
The average annual income from vegetable sales alone was
town market. There were approximately 144 households with
around
1,300 yuan per person in the village. Income from
400 people in total. However, in 2004, the Kangding governanimal
husbandry
and the harvest of medicinal plants such
ment decided to erect a new town on village farmland with
as
caterpillar
fungus
were not included. They constitute at
approval and funding from the Sichuan provincial governleast
40
percent
of
rural
income in the Tibet Autonomous
ment. The project area stretched beyond the village boundary
Region
(Winkler
2008).
According
to 2005 data, there was an
to include land of two neighbouring villages. As a result, the
increase
in
productivity
of
5.8
percent
in the primary sector
local government relocated 800 villagers in 177 households.
compared
to
the
previous
year.
In
2010,
the average increase
The county government appoints the township and village
in
vegetable
prices
was
16
percent
(Sichuan
Price Online
leaders. A relatively rich Han villager was appointed as the
2010).
Considering
the
increasing
trend
in
productivity
and in
head of the Simaqiao village committee along with six comcommodity
pricmittee members.
es,
income
from
There were no
vegetable sales of
official records of
a household with
the village’s pop7-8
members
ulation by ethwould
be
15,000
nicity, although
and
20,000
yuan.
almost every vilIn
other
words,
lager possesses an
the villagers’ own
ID card indicating
estimation
of
his or her ethnic
their
income
priidentity. Accordor to the project
ing to villagers
was, more or less,
whom I interin
accordance
viewed, however,
with
the
official
the Tibetan and
figures.
The
ecoHan populations
nomic
viability
of
were roughly 60
their
cash
cropand 40 percent
based livelihoods
A century old church demolished in Simaqiao. Photo: Tashi Nyima
r e s p e c t i v e l y,
was one of the
divided among
main
reasons
why
the
urbanization
project
met with opposiTibetan Buddhists, Catholics, and nonbelievers. Simaqiao was
tion.
the only Christian community in the region with a centuryold church located in the heart of the village. A Christian misMETHOD AND THE FIELD-SITE
sionary constructed the church in the nineteenth century. The
local government, however, approved the demolishing of the
Simaqiao was the main site of my fieldwork, although I
church, along with other village houses. The villagers mostly
also interviewed informants from outside the village. I conspeak the Sichuanese dialect while Tibetan is used only in
ducted in-depth interviews in 30 households and with 10
some private homes. Many residents, particularly young vilindividual villagers. In addition, there were 40 local governlagers, are ethnically Tibetan but cannot speak Tibetan.
ment officials from various work units, including the village
There were 1,598 mu (about 106.5 hectares) of cultivable
leader. Interviews typically lasted more than two hours, infarmland in Simaqiao Township, with 1,744 farmers includcluded formal questions and informal interactions. Houseing 1,126 Tibetans and 609 Han (Kangding County History
hold interviews were conducted in such a way that members,
1997:15). Interviewees estimated their total household inincluding household heads, sat together when responding
come prior to relocation to be roughly 20-30,000 yuan per
to questions. In some cases, I interviewed members of the
year. This exceeds the income of two people engaged in fullsame household repeatedly. I also had the opportunity, fortime work as self-employed taxi drivers in the town. Accordmally and informally, to interact with many locals in the old
ing to official data, the average rural net-income per person in
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town, including several well-educated residents.1 Fieldwork
in Ganzi and Yushu occurred between June and September
2007. Political unrest in the region prevented access in 2008.
Nevertheless, I have through telephone and electronic communication followed development in the region during the
last three years.
Officially, Kangding has 113,238 permanent residents,
including 106,474 people with local household registration
(hukou). The county has 70,641 Tibetans, 34,132 Han, and
1,701 members belonging to other ethnic groups living on
11,600 square kilometres (Ganzi Yearbook 2006). The old
Kangding town (2.3 km2) became one of the most densely
populated places in China and the world, with 26,000 residents per km2 (Ganzi Prefecture Government 2008). One reason could be the unique location of Kangding, which is surrounded by steep mountains that sandwich the town. There
is thus not enough space for the growing population. On the
other hand, with its relatively low altitude of 2,500 meters
and its proximity to metropolitan Chengdu, Kangding provides easy access to migrants and tourists alike. Thus, high
population density was stated as an important reason why a
new town was needed to catalyze development.
In 2005, the total production output in the county was
660 million yuan, an increase of 20 percent from the previous year. The increases found were 5.8, 44, and 10 percent in
the agricultural, industrial, and tertiary sectors, respectively
(Ganzi Yearbook 2006: 295). The increase in the industrial
sector indicates the current influx of investment by mining
and hydro companies. In 2005, the secondary sector constituted 44 percent and the tertiary sector 43 percent of the local economy, with the agricultural sector constituting the rest
(ibid.).
When I first arrived in Kangding for fieldwork in the summer of 2007, much of the relocation issue remained “unsettled.” The majority of the 800 villagers had already moved
into new apartments but were complaining to the construction companies and the local government about construction
defects, which residents were eager to show me. In addition,
there were dozens of villagers living in improvised roadside
settlements. They either refused to move into the new apartments or did not receive one, and some protests occurred
outside the newly built apartment blocks. During my fieldwork, the construction of the planned town was under full
swing, and some roadside shops near the apartment blocks
were already finished. Larger buildings were halfway through
construction.
In contrast, local officials whom I interviewed projected
a bright picture of the new town plan. According to them,
villagers were compensated generously by the government.
Nevertheless, the controversy between the construction companies, whom the county government contracted to build the
new apartments, local government, and the villagers, was ongoing when I arrived and remained so until I left Kangding.
1. All names in this article are pseudonyms.

82

HIMALAYA XXX (1-2) 2010

WHY URBANIZATION?
Kangding County government has aimed primarily to
provide residential and nonresidential space for local communist party, military, government (dangzheng jiguan), and public institution staff (Ganzi Prefecture Government 2007). The
total investment in the new town had reached approximately
800 million yuan by the time it was completed (ibid). The
project thus constituted a significant amount of investment to
the local economy equivalent to 13 years of the county’s revenue (Ganzi Yearbook 2006). Mining, hydropower, and tourism are the main sources of revenue for the prefecture government. In this context, the construction of the new town is part
of a broader development campaign not only to urbanize and
extract natural resources but also to build up local government institutions (Yang 2007).
The local government had internally begun discussing the
idea of the New Kangding Town project some years prior to
the construction in May 2005. Two months before the construction began, most of the villagers had moved out, with
their farmlands expropriated. Once a “backward” village, Simaqiao was now perceived to be “developed.” The construction was subsequently portrayed as part of campaigns such
as the “Scientific Development View” in 2003 (kexue fazhan
guan) and the “New Socialist Village” in 2005 (shehui zhuyi
xinnongcun) and “Develop the People, Stabilize Kham” in
2007 (fumin ankang). At the heart of “scientific development”
lies the idea of “people first” (renweiben), meaning the interest and the voice of the people are to be safeguarded in the
“development” process. The “new socialist village” aims to
“develop” a backward production system, modernize farmers, and “stabilize” backward villages in order to raise family
incomes. The underlying assumption is that local villagers are
of “low quality” (suzhidi) and have a “backward mentality”
(sixiang luohou), which have been singled out as the principal
causes for the aforementioned problems. In accordance with
this discursive representation, the government thus launched
the “three rurals” (sannong) program to end the “chronic
problems of poverty” facing rural villagers.
THE OFFICIAL RATIONALE OF DEVELOPMENT
In 2006, Li Peixue, the head of Kangding County and
Chen Nanqiao of the China Power group— a Taiwan-based
real estate development company—signed a formal investment contract (Chang 2006) paving the way for the company to invest in Ganzi. The head of the provincial Taiwan
Affairs Office attended the meeting along with the prefecture
leadership. According to the contract, the latter was to invest
300 million yuan to construct the commercial district and
the pedestrian street of the planned town while the county
government was to provide village farmland for construction.
Chengdu Sanjian, one of the largest construction companies
in Sichuan, was contracted to complete the project.
A few months later, the prefecture government made an
official statement on its website outlining the project’s rationale (Ganzi Administration Online 2007), and circulated it

widely through the official media, especially official Internet
sites. The goals of the new Kangding town plan were primarily to “safeguard the unification of the motherland [weihu
zuguo tongyi] and stabilize the situation in Tibetan regions”
(wending zangqujushi). Being the political, cultural, and economic centre of Ganzi Prefecture, Kangding has occupied a
strategic position (zhanlue yaodi) in the maintenance of “stability” and “governance” of Tibetan regions as a whole. The
development of a strong local government has always been
the main concern behind official development campaigns and
policies in western China since the 2000s and even before
(Demurger 2002).
Promoting economic development was the plan’s second
major goal. Official discourse portrayed the urbanization project as necessary to solidify Kangding’s “strategic position in
ecological and cultural tourism in Western China.” The government, therefore, intends to construct the new town “scientifically” with “local cultural characteristics,” and “unearth the
romantic culture of folk music” (wajue qinge wenhua). The
plan was thus to construct not only a new town but also a
tourist destination similar to ethnic theme parks, tourist sites
or “scenic spots” elsewhere in minority regions (Nyiri 2006).
The plan was to “theme” the new town in order to attract
tourists, increase property values, and bring certain messages
to the public eye. On construction site walls large characters reading “ethnic unity” (minzutuanjie), “social harmony”
(shehui hexian), and development (fazhan) were written in
Chinese. The town was intended to house 100–120,000 new
residents (Ganzi Administration Online 2007). The county
officials explained that, in addition to social stability and
population reduction, the commoditization of local Tibetan
culture would not only “preserve” but also “develop” it.
The government’s development discourse thus invoked
an array of concepts that closely paralleled the international
discourse. Concurrently, the government’s rhetoric could be
distinguished from the “global” discourse of development,
and could thereby be regarded as “uniquely Chinese.” Urbanization and industrialization had always been understood as
the main priorities of development in official discourse (Chen
2004; Yeung, Jin, and Zeng 2004). Based on the local government’s statements on the project, the development interventions in Kangding had multiple dimensions and purposes.
Questions of social stability, economic growth, demographic
accommodation, and modernization are all built-in goals of
new Kangding town’s construction.
The relocation of Simaqiao’s villagers was barely mentioned in the statement. The only village-related information
stated that the work related to relocation including school enrolment for children, social insurance, unemployment insurance, and other benefits had been “successfully completed”
(shunli wancheng). The villagers found themselves powerless
before the powerful official development campaign. Their
only option was to ensure that the government delivered on
its promises. In official discourse, urbanization has come to
mean, among other things, the construction of modern infra-

structure coupled with migration, whereas industrialization
has been mainly about the extraction of natural resources. If
urbanization was to be understood as the driving force for
development, how had this socioeconomic and political project been experienced, contested, and negotiated? How has
the transformation of Simaqiao into a new town affected the
livelihood of villagers? An investigation of local villagers’ experience of project implementation illuminates what development means on the ground.
LAND EXPROPRIATION: PROMISES OF A BETTER
FUTURE
In summer 2004, a delegation of Kangding County, township, and village-level officials, including the deputy party
secretary Huang, accompanied by the village leader, Tan,
came to Simaqiao. These are the key state bureaucratic institutions responsible for any policy implementation in rural
China. The purpose was to inform villagers about the plan to
turn their village into a “modern” town. The villagers were
shocked that the county government had decided to build a
new town on their farmland. Many whom I interviewed reported a reaction of disbelief; they could not fathom the idea
of moving from their age-old homes. Other concerns arose,
including their livelihood, children’s future and so on. Many
villagers, especially the elders, found it unbearable to give up
farming and move into apartments. I was confronted with a
sense of desperation and hopelessness among the relocated
villagers. Dao, a village elder who initially opposed the plan,
said,
We were not prepared to go from our ancestral
home and live together in the new apartment
blocks, but what could we, ordinary people
[laobaixing], do? We did not have any choice
but had to follow what came from the top.
The government had promised that everything
would be provided once we had moved, and we
would then be living in paradise.

Despite its proximity to old Kangding town, Simaqiao
used to be what the villagers described as “a peaceful village”
(anjing de cunzi). A 67-year villager named Cheng, who lived
with his children and grandchildren, said everyday dealings
(laiwang) with county-level officials prior to the project were
relatively few, but started to change when the project began.
Cheng was present during the meeting, and likened it to any
other official meeting, “in which the officials had coerced
the villagers to follow in accordance with the official policy
imperative.” Opposition to the project during the first meetings was intense. In order for the villagers to accept the plan,
the local government packaged it with an array of promises,
including the provision of modern block apartments. The
apartments were between 85 and 150 square metres in size,
and were to be of better quality than their former houses. The
government also promised to compensate villagers 270 yuan
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per square metre of their old houses, and the opportunity to
buy a 22-square meter shop space in the new town to secure
future incomes. They were also offered 10,000 yuan per mu
of farmland. The government promised to build one school
within the new town for village children and promised that
villagers older than 60 would receive old-age subsidies along
with benefits for the unemployed. According to village informants, they were also promised minimum living insurance
as urban residents (chengshi jumin dibao). The promises, according to the village informants, were too good to be true.
In the midst of villagers’ scepticism the government promises
brought a sense of curiosity and excitement of living in a new
town without the hard labor to which they were accustomed.
The plan was also discussed in the media and official policy
meetings as part of the policy to eradicate the “difficult” livelihood problems of rural villages.
The transformation of the village into a town in which
residents would enjoy the benefits of modern living was spoken of as the government’s mission. One county official, who
was responsible for project implementation, summarized the
policy, “…under the benevolence [guanghuaixia] of the party
and the state, the county government decided to build the
new town in Simaqiao as part of the “Open up the West” and
the “New Socialist Village” policies. The idea was to bring
about “new life” [xinshenghuo] to the villagers.” It was, therefore, crucial for the officials that the villagers buy into the
idea and move out from the village in time. He was confident
that the project would bring opportunities to the villagers in
the long run, despite “temporary” problems of livelihood and
economic grievances.
During the land expropriation, however, officials warned
the sceptical, if not defiant, villagers about the irreversibility of the government plan since it was supported by those
“higher-up” (shangji) and was in the “public interest” (gongongliyi). It was thus “natural” for the villagers to move out
since the state held ultimate land ownership. The local government had to follow proper procedures of land expropriation, compensation and housing accommodations. Constitutionally, the village collective has the right to use and manage
the land. However, it has no right to transfer land for compensatory use. The state may, in accordance with the constitution, expropriate land under collective ownership if it is
in the public interest (Guo 2001: 424). In theory, the local
government did not have direct access to the farmland under
Simaqiao village committee. According to villagers, their leader, unlike elected village leaders elsewhere in China, was appointed by the township administration. In terms of housing,
the government had planned to construct six six-storey apartment blocks in the corner of the planned town. The officials
whom I interviewed interpreted the housing construction as
a means to provide compensation and modern accommodation for the villagers more than a means to create livelihoods,
and thought it would effectively win over the villagers who
had been living in “backward” conditions. Some villagers,
however, negotiated farmland compensation and asked for
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180,000 yuan per mu. However, the overwhelming majority
of the villagers whom I interviewed opposed the plan. After
several meetings, the local government raised the farmland
compensation to 36,966 yuan per mu while the rest of the
government package remained unchanged. Officials became
increasingly frustrated and threatened to bulldoze the villagers’ houses if they continued in their opposition. The villagers, hardly unified, had to choose between accepting the plan
or continuing to engage in what many described as a “hopeless battle” against the government. In the meantime, the local
government launched a signature campaign and deployed a
series of new tactics to convert the villagers.
The village committee began to recruit new party members. One notable reinterpretation of what it meant to be a
communist party member was to obey party decisions. According to Dao, new party members were pushed to accede to
this in order to convince others to follow. Party membership
provided a network of relations with other party members,
including the village leader. Such connections later proved
useful in getting apartments, construction jobs, and other
benefits of development. After the recruitment, the village officials cajoled the families and friends of new party members
into accepting the plan. Another tactic, according to the villagers, was to spread rumors saying the majority of the villagers had signed in favor of the plan when, in fact, this was
not the case. Thus, it prompted a number of households to
give up their opposition. Ultimately, with various tactics and
forceful language, the local government removed the villagers
from their homes and farmlands in March 2005. As a result,
Simaqiao villagers joined millions of other “land-lost farmers”
in China.
According to the villagers the Kangding government resold the expropriated agricultural land (around 400 mu) for
400,000 yuan per mu. Villagers cited this when they complained about the corruption of local officials. Nevertheless,
the head of the local Bureau of Land told me that the government had sold to the China Power group 190 mu of land at
around 200,000 yuan per mu. The government contracted
the rest of the land to Chengdu Sanjian. The gap between
the officially stated price and that mentioned by the villagers
was significant and impossible to verify. However, based on
its own figures, the local government earned a net-profit of at
least 70 million yuan through the sale of Simaqiao’s farmland
to the investors alone. The villagers received only 18 percent
of the market price as compensation for their land; the rest
went to the local government. Later, the construction companies resold newly constructed apartments to the local government at a market price of 3,600 yuan per square meter. It is
obvious who has benefitted from the land expropriation and
urbanization project.
LIFE IN THE NEW COMMUNITY: DEVELOPMENT AS
“COMFORTABLE HOUSES”
The government paid villagers a “transitional compensation” (guodufei) of 150 yuan per head per month in 2005 to

be temporarily settled before moving into new apartments.
The government promised to complete these by the end of
2005 but did not do so until 2006. The villagers’ demand
for compensation for that year was rejected with no further
explanation. Local officials told me that the villagers were well
compensated. Except for a few county and village level officials, most in the local government do not have much knowledge of land expropriation and compensation. Some even
confused the transitional compensation with minimum urban
living expenses. However, most officials were well versed in
the relevant government policies when asked about Simaqiao, and projected a rosy picture of how villagers benefitted.
To the contrary, the first year was difficult for the villagers
who had to live on the compensation fund, as town residents
without farm work. As Wang, a 57-year old villager said,“...in
the beginning, we thought that the compensation we received
for our land was an enormous amount. However, once we
began to live in the town, we discovered that it was nothing
compared to the high-living expenses in the town, and after
what we had to pay for the apartments as well.”
In late 2006 and early 2007 the relocated farmers started
moving into new apartments that cost 850 yuan per square
meter. While the government was to pay between 30 and 35
percent of the total cost, the rest had to be borne by the villagers. There were approximately 200 new apartments of varying
sizes. In reality, the local government paid only 750 yuan per
square meter when they bought them from the construction
companies. Distribution of the apartments, however, became
problematic. Distribution was to be based on land ownership,
which in theory indicated the size of the family, but in reality
other factors held sway. The family size of households has
changed significantly since the early 1980s. This meant that
the government could only allocate apartments to those who
had farmland of their own prior to the project. The allocation
rationale thus rendered many young villagers homeless since
those born after de-collectivization in the early 1980s did not
have land.
De-collectivization allocated farmland to households
based on the number of family members. Village households
in Simaqiao, like elsewhere in rural Tibet, were composed
of three generations with many siblings who held farmland
jointly. However, a single apartment of 95 square meters was
not enough space for families with more than 8 members.
They required two apartments but could only afford to buy
one. This situation was particularly problematic for young
people who had raised families on their parents’ farmland but
did not have land of their own, and were typically left without apartments. Furthermore, outsiders who had married
local villagers did not have farmland and ended up without
apartments. Taking matters into their own hands, these villagers turned, individually or collectively, to the Administrative
Committee, deputy party secretary Huang, and other organizations for help. Some even set up stands in the middle of
community to protest when they had no options left in their
dealings with bureaucracies. I noticed that, in spite of all the

private criticisms, most villagers did not offer public defiance
or protest out of fear of repercussions.
After the relocation, the villagers lived mainly on the compensation fund but were unaccustomed to planning their
household economies as town residents. This resulted in the
unwise and sometimes unscrupulous use of the compensation fund. Previously, the villagers had enjoyed a subsistence
livelihood. They produced many of their necessities, although
it is difficult to put a precise cash value on farm products for
self-consumption. In contrast, the government’s compensation appeared, at first sight, to be a large sum for the villagers.
According to my own survey a household with 7-8 members,
5 mu of land, and a 250 square meter house would be compensated 184,830 yuan for the land (RMB 36,966/mu) and
67,500 yuan for their house (RMB 270/meter) for a total of
251,500 yuan. Compensation funds quickly vanished into
housing and other expenses. Each household had to repay
the government 56,528 yuan for the 95-square-meter apartment they bought after the 30 percent government subsidy,
and the 22-square-meter shop cost 18,700 yuan. Thus, once
each village household with approximately 7.5 members paid
back 75,228 yuan, they were left with a total of 176,272. It
was all they had for the foreseeable future without farmland
and a need to buy all their food, cover medical insurance,
education, and other living expenses for the entire family.
Three years after expropriation, the government promises
had not materialized. Government subsidies for unemployment, minimum living expenses for urban residents, and a
new school were not delivered. The only promise kept was
old-age insurance for those over 60. In interviews, some villagers stated that they had misunderstood the promise as social
security to cover the daily living expenses of this age group.
In Kangding, 60 yuan could only buy two kilograms of pork.
A 67-year old villager, who complained desperately about the
relocation, said “…had I known this was what I would receive, I would never even dream of agreeing to move.” The
language of disappointment, dispossession, and desperation
countered the government’s discourse of development. Not
surprisingly, the deterioration of relations between the local
government and the villagers intensified. The villagers whom
I interviewed blamed the local government for taking advantage of their illiteracy in national law and central government policies. They had expropriated farmland and houses
for very little compensation. Ironically, peoples’ livelihoods
deteriorated compared to the “subsistence” economy prior to
the development project. A failure of the new town plan has
therefore been its inability to address the villagers’ livelihoods
in the post-relocation period. There seems to have been an
underlying assumption that the construction of a new town
would automatically create opportunities and prosperity for
the villagers despite there being no concrete proposals for
how to achieve that goal.
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW COMMUNITY
Unemployment was a serious problem within the com-
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munity, although the local officials did not have statistics on
unemployment. My interview data suggests that more than
85 percent of people aged between 16 and 60 were unemployed. Previously, only a few people worked in the town,
while most villagers engaged in cultivation. After the sudden
relocation, most villagers found themselves without a job.
Prior to the relocation, the local Department of Labour and
Human Resources conducted a one-day job training for relocated villagers but this did not result in the employment
of any trainees afterward. During my fieldwork, there were
many young villagers searching for employment, including
petty jobs. Commenting on development, a 29-year-old villager said, “We had work to do before they developed us.
After the development, we were turned into jobless beggars.
The government promised us a “paradise”, but we have ended
up in hell”. Another informant said, “Development must be
good from a bigger picture [dade fangmian], but it is just not
helping us improve our lives. It has only enriched the local
officials and their acquaintances”.
A former village, Simaqiao has been incorporated into
Kangding County municipality. The overwhelming majority of the villagers whom I interviewed spoke nostalgically
about village life prior to relocation. Previously, the pressure
for making cash income or finding employment was relatively
low. Life in the village was more or less self-sufficient. In addition to consumption of their own farm products, villagers
also sold produce for cash, and kept cows, sheep, pigs, and
chickens. Despite the official discourse of the backward village, Simaqiao’s residents were self-sufficient and had access
to the market.
In interviews county government officials cited the Bureau
of Human Resources and Labour as the agency responsible for
the villagers’ employment issues. In cooperation with the village committee and several government agencies the Human
Resources Bureau set up an unemployment insurance fund
in 2006. Only 112 land-lost farmers from Simaqiao and the
neighbouring villages participated in the program, according to the officials. Villagers told me that they did not know
about this program, or simply did not trust it and thought
it was too expensive in relation to what they got in return.
The total fund was 934,016 Yuan, including a Bureau of Finance grant of 400,000 Yuan and the contributions from the
villagers of 534,016 Yuan. This meant that each participant
had to pay 4,768 Yuan for one-time insurance in order to
receive employment benefits of 3,572 Yuan from the government (Kangba 2006). Each would thus receive 347 Yuan per
month for two years. However, the insurance was too expensive for villagers whose average wage was around 1,000 Yuan
per month.
The local media and officials portrayed the villagers in
glowing terms, despite the contentious situation on the
ground. Apart from the unemployment benefits, few mechanisms were in place to secure access to the labour market in
the post-relocation period. The villagers had to find work on
their own. Villagers frequently told me that they were desper-
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ately looking for jobs. The low level of education and the lack
of “guanxi” connections left them particularly vulnerable to
discrimination in the labour market. People frequently stated
in interviews that construction company bosses did not want
them because outside workers were perceived as being better “skilled” and “intelligent” than the villagers. Ironically, the
local officials, including the village leader, believed that the
villagers were too lazy to find jobs. According to some local officials, the main problem was that villagers wasted their
time drinking, playing mahjong, and watching videos.
Local officials depicted villagers as supposedly having the
choice between work and wasting time. However, approximately 10-15 villagers worked on the construction site and
were paid 40 Yuan per day without food and shelter, even as
workers from the outside were paid 60 Yuan plus food and
shelter. In TAR, Tibetan construction workers normally get 60
Yuan per day as of 2010. Construction companies often failed
to pay the villagers on time for this low-skilled construction
work. Nevertheless, these jobs were rarely available for those
willing to work. The village leader and party members, in
cooperation with the local construction companies, were in
control of the construction work. From time to time, the village leader used his influence to find construction jobs for his
relatives and friends. Regarding development an unemployed
villager said, “Does it matter what I think about development?
I have no land, no job, no home, no money, and no power.”
Previously, the villagers, young and old, had enough work to
do on their own farms. After relocation they became dependent on the compensation money.
INCOME GENERATION
Unemployment exacerbates the problem of family income. However, officials from the prefecture’s Department
of Poverty Alleviation described Simaqiao as an “exceptional
case” (teshude) in the sense that its villagers had received generous compensation from the government. They were thus
well-off and had no need of government support. There were,
however, approximately ten households in Simaqiao and the
nearby villages that received minimum life insurance prior
to relocation. The selection of the low-income households
(dibaohu) was said to be fair and transparent. The process was
publicly announced and selection made through the township government and village committee. In Simaqiao, the selection process was, however, far from transparent. A 34-year
old villager, Zhaxi, described the procedure:
… it was carried out silently. The village leader
and his men distributed the list and selected
their candidates. If we raised objections or suggestions, they would not care much. The voice
of the common people [laobaixing], whatever
we do or say, does not have any weight or influence over the decisions of those in power. In
other words, if you have power, then you have
everything, including wealth [you quanjiu you

qian]. If not, you are nothing.

During a videotaped conversation, I repeated the official
claim of transparency and fairness to a group of young villagers and met with strong dissent. A woman responded, “We
have no land, no apartment, and no source of livelihood. Our
lives have been virtually impoverished because of this project.” She dismissed the statement of transparency and high
income as a “joke”[chuiniude] and added,“All this is just talk.
Ultimately, it is power and nepotism that decide who gets
what here.”
Except the monthly old-age insurance of 60 Yuan per
person, the minimum life insurance for ten households was
the only economic support provided by the government. Approximately 15 households in Simaqiao owned rental cars for
driving in and out of town, mainly to the local hot spring.
Most homeless and unemployed villagers struggled to meet
their daily needs in the new community. Villagers often understood development as an official project designed, first and
foremost, to strengthen the state (guojia) while the government officials themselves become prosperous in the process.
Speaking back: The counter-discourse of development
I often asked villagers, “How is the new life?” The common
response was “[it is a] hard life” (hen laoku), an expression
often used in the Sichuanese dialect. They would elaborate,
“Nowadays, we do not have land, no apartment, and not even
a source of livelihood.” It was evident that the main grievance
was the lack of livelihood opportunities. I then asked, “What
about the hundreds and thousands from the compensation
fund, and the new fancy apartments?” I even repeated what
I heard from government officials and some town residents
that the villagers had received about 300-400,000 Yuan from
the government and other benefits as well, including access
to urban facilities. The two most frequent responses I received
were either “No, that is not true” or “Yes, that is true. We
have received them but have spent them on the apartments in
which we are living.” The contention then boiled down to the
nature of the compensation.
Many villagers felt the compensation funds were only a
trick to deceive them into accepting the government’s development plan. The official discourse projected a bright future
for the villagers in the new town. The villagers, in their own
opinion, were first dispossessed of their traditional means of
livelihood, and then eventually lost their own voice. When
the local government was unable to fulfil its promised compensation, the voices and grievances of the villagers became
depoliticized. The local authorities characterized contention
as a “practical or technical” problem rather than a question
of power relations and participation. In desperation, villagers
established their own representative group with 12 members
who were elected to petition the local government to address
their socioeconomic problems, above all, the loss of their
farmland and homes.
When asked, most villagers I interviewed defined develop-

ment as something positive, desirable, and directly related to
the improvement of livelihood. But no one believed they had
benefitted from such “development.” Villagers unanimously
agreed that they were not “developed” due to the project but
that the local officials and the state in general had become developed. When asked about development, one villager in his
mid-30s responded, “We are not developed but impoverished
[bianqiong le]. The state and the local officials involved in the
project have been developed.” For the villagers, the official
development of their centuries-old village life did not result in
the improvement of their livelihoods and income as they had
hoped prior to the relocation.
The villagers were deeply suspicious of the officials. During the farmland expropriation, the village committee, headed by the village leader, played a pivotal role in mediation
between villagers and local officials. Tan used his unique position as both a grassroots level official and a local villager to
implement the project. He established close connections with
his superiors such as the county party secretary and managed
the construction work. When the project was announced, he
was at first sympathetic to the desires of the villagers. However, as he began to work with the county officials, he switched
his loyalty and became the main figure in its implementation.
He used his networks, including family relations, to get as
many as possible to accept the plan. In a number of interviews, the villagers accused this village leader of corruption.
In 2009, allegations of corruption against the village
leader were made in a strongly worded petition in the name
of Simaqiao’s villagers addressed to the provincial Discipline
Inspection Bureau. The petition was blogged anonymously
on the Internet, giving details of how the village leader and
his fellow cadres used their power and positions to accumulate massive wealth (Baidu 2009). In interviews two years
earlier, I had been told that the village leader controlled the
construction work, including work contracts. He was accused
of pocketing up to 30,000 Yuan from construction workers’
wages and the sale of materials to the construction companies. He paid less to the workers per cubic meter of sand and
stone than they were supposed to get, and bargained for higher prices on these construction materials than the initial price.
Tan was thus labelled “the land emperor” (tuhuangdi) in the
petition, which begged the provincial authority for further investigation. As of October 2010, however, there had been no
response from either the prefectural or provincial authorities .
The local government, after the completion of the new
town in 2008, launched a lavish ribbon-cutting ceremony to
inaugurate the transfer of the local party and the government
offices into the new town. Thousands of people, including
top officials of the prefecture, gathered to celebrate what they
described as the successful completion of a new town within
three years. It was interpreted as a clear sign of rapid development in the county. This affirms what Yeh (2008) termed
“administrative urbanization”, meaning urbanization that
has been primarily centred on and around the development
of state institutions rather than private enterprises. The first
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beneficiaries are thus the people working within the state institutions. In the labour market created by these government
projects, Chinese migrants enjoy better structural advantages,
including language skills, comparatively higher education,
and better connections or networks than the local Tibetans
(Fischer 2005; Yeh 2006).
The county government had contracted real estate companies to build offices, residential blocks, and commercial
apartments. However, the global financial crisis in the following year affected the housing market. Therefore, in order
to attract “middle class” customers from Chengdu and other
metropolises to buy houses in the new town, the local government decided to subsidize buyers of apartments there (20,000
Yuan to Kangding residents and 10,000 to outsiders) (Chen
2009). The offer was available between May 1 and December
31, 2009. The real estate companies were to also provide a
series of preferential incentives such as free assistance service.
The local government presented the apartments as potential
“summer houses” for those who wished to flee the scorching
heat in Chengdu and Chongqing.
In official discourse, government officials represented the
development of Simaqiao as a benevolent gesture to the “backward”, “unstable”, and “traditionally minded” villagers, although the villagers did not identify themselves as “backward”
and “primitive.” Development was further constructed to be
both “scientific” and “people-based.” Officials were convinced
that the this project had served the people’s interest, although
the villagers had experienced development as a disruption of
their traditional subsistence livelihood, something that every
villager interviewed would return to if given the choice. The
“side effects” of development described by Ferguson apply
here. According to Ferguson (1994), development projects
produce regular and often unintended side effects such as the
expansion of state power. In the process of urbanization, the
villagers’ own rights and ability to shape development were
significantly constrained while the state bureaucratic power
expanded into the village. Contrary to the government’s rhetoric, the means of livelihood in the transformed community
were far from secured. Instead of responding to the grievances
of villagers, local officials attempted to achieve the targets and
priorities established by their superiors. The official ideology
of development thus masked some notable effects. First, with
the invocation of “people-based” or “scientific” development,
the official development discourse has systematically concealed the direct and unintended outcomes of development,
namely the expansion of urbanization at the expense of local
villagers. Moreover, the participation of local people in development was rarely mentioned as an alternative approach.
Urbanization was perceived to be part of the “marketization” (shichanghua) process, according to the local officials
whom I interviewed. In other words, the village was modernized. Nonetheless, the lack of post-relocation livelihood
opportunities has been a source of distress for landless villagers. The implementation of the project had placed the (mostly
Tibetan) villagers in limbo. They were no longer “villagers”
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since they had lost their homes and land to the project, and
were not “town residents” either since they did not receive
minimum living insurance as town residents. The official development drive in Kangding could thus be interpreted to be
what Hobart (1993), Baudrillard et al. (1988), and Fairhead
(2000) have termed the “process of de-civilisation”—meaning
the detachment of development discourse from the voice and
philosophy of the subjects. In Kangding, the official “development project” removed the villagers from the process of
thinking, arguing, and acting on what defines “civilization” in
the making of the development plan.
The government’s priorities and goals are designed within the framework of the Chinese state system, which Croll
(1994) described as the “identifiable and the centralized
agency of development.” This “agency” can be divided into
central, provincial, and local prefecture, county, township and
village levels of government. The local agents of development
since pre-reform China were designated to adapt national
policies to local “conditions” (ibid.). In the case of Kangding,
the County government initially planned the project with approval from the provincial and central government. Thus, the
idea of “local agents” only applies to the county level but not
to the township and village. The local authorities had consulted neither the villagers nor the village leader when they formulated the plan to construct the new town. Far from seeing
local villagers as active agents of change, the official discourse
portrayed them as “backward”, “passive”, and in need of state
intervention. In the process, it failed to take into account the
value of traditional livelihoods for people when planning the
project. More often than not, deals were sealed between the
village leaders and the county governments unbeknownst to
the villagers themselves (Guo 2001:430). In addition to an
immediate decline in household incomes, the material freedom provided by the subsistence-based economy was also
lost. Meanwhile, dependency on state institutions, in spite of
lack of compensation, has been a major “unintended” consequence.
CONCLUSION
Development in official discourse has primarily been defined by predetermined goals: long-term social stability, regional development, and modernization of the “backward
periphery.” In Kangding, the thrust of development has been
the construction of the new town, which, although assumed
to improve the livelihood of the villagers, has sidelined their
participation in various stages of the construction. The polarized discrepancies between the official discourse and the local
counter-discourse are thus prominent. When they deploy the
concept of development, officials often tend to stress social
stability (i.e., the absence of any form of protest), mineral resource extraction, accommodation of migrants, and above all,
the strengthening of state institutions. The villagers, on the
other hand, were preoccupied with their own everyday challenges of low income, unemployment and lack of housing.
The new town per se was only secondary to them. Whenever

I discussed development with villagers, I noticed a sense of
scepticism. Their resistance, however, cannot be interpreted
as a rejection of the idea of development. On the contrary,
villagers perceived development to be inherently good if carried out with “pure” intention. Development programs could
serve the interests of the people if they took into account their
wishes and grievances.
Top-down programs deprive villagers of their participation in planning. Villagers were portrayed as the “development problem.” Ironically, the implementation had simultaneously depoliticized the project and portrayed it to be
technically necessary for a number of reasons, particularly
for political stability. The villagers, who the official discourse
constructs as “backward” and “primitive”, were supposed to
be the focus of development. However, their own experiences
of development hardly correspond to the glittering official
representations. The attempt to redefine the project in their
own terms had met with very little success due to existing
power relations. The aforementioned goals and development
ideology deployed within the official discourse have, therefore, surprisingly little relevance to the actual wishes and desires of the villagers.
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